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A.

OLIN*

INTRODUCTION

If the Internet is an explosion, we are living smack-dab in the
middle of the mushroom cloud. In less than four years, there will
be over 765 million Internet users.1 By 2003, consumer e-com
merce revenues could approach $150 billion and annual business
to-business e-commerce revenues could reach $2.8 trillion.2 At pre
sent, more than five million e-mail messages are sent around the

* The author, a former litigator at Robinson & Cole LLP in Hartford, Connecti
cut, is law clerk to United States Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The views expressed in this
article are entirely the author's own.
1. Am. Bar Ass'n Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, Achieving Legal and
Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the
Internet 4 (July 10, 2000), at http://www.abanet.orgibuslaw/cyber/initiatives/draft.rtf
[hereinafter Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report] (citing Europe and Asia Play
Catch-up with the U.S. (Jan. 11, 2000), at http://www.e-land.com/estats/
011100_wwinternetuse.html).
2. Id. (citing Boston Consulting Group & Shop.org, New BCG Study Re-Evalu
ates Size, Growth and Importance of Business- To-Business E-Commerce (Dec. 21,
1999), and Vanessa Hua, E-Shopping: Online Predictions; Despite Huge States, Net Sales
Estimates No More Than Educated Guess, EXAMINER, Dec. 6, 1999).
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world each minute. 3 Indeed, cybergrowth has been compared to
bacterial replication and rabbit ·procreation. 4
Just as the Internet boom has impacted nearly every aspect of
daily life, it has also affected traditional, property-based law. The
growing pains associated with this exponential legal transformation
have prompted one court to observe that applying established legal
concepts to cyberspace "is somewhat like trying to board a moving
bus."5 Within the District of Massachusetts, Judge Nancy Gertner
puts it this way:
To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned,
not only is there perhaps "no there there," the "there" is every
where where there is Internet access. When business is transacted
over a computer net~ork via a Web-site accessed by a computer
in Massachusetts, it takes place as much in Massachusetts, liter
.
ally or figuratively, as it does anywhere. 6

Civil procedure in general, and the doctrine of personal juris
diction in particular, is no exception. Thus, it is no coincidence that,
in recent years, the variety of lower federal courts that have tried to
apply familiar personal jurisdictional principles to a new computer
ized world have often reached inconsistent results. 7 The United
3. Id. at 3 (citing Carleton Foirina, The Communications Revolution, in COM
MONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA MONTHLY NEWSLETrER, July 19, 1999, available at
http://www.commonwealthclub.org).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997).
6. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass.
1997); see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 37 (D. Mass. 1997)
(noting that "[t]he explosive growth 'of the Internet has sparked new debates in the law"
and that "'Cyberspace' poses new issues regarding copyrights and Internet sites, First
Amendment inquiries, trademark, and personal jurisdiction issues").
7. Compare, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161, 166 (D.
Conn. 1996) (exercising personal jurisdiction in Connecticut over Massachusetts defen
dant that did littl!! more than establish passive web-site), with Bensusan Rest: Corp. v.
King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[c]reating a [web-]site, like placing a
product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but,
without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state"), affd, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). See also Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F.
Supp. 404,406 (E.D. Va. 1997) (observing that Bensusan and Inset reached opposite
holdings "[o]n nearly identical facts"); Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias,
Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 24 No.2 LITIG. 27, 34 (1998) (not
ing that many courts other than Inset and Bensusan "recently have rendered personal
jurisdiction decisions involving the Internet, and they weave a tangled web"); Dale M.
Cendali & Rebecca L. Weinstein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, in SECOND
ANN. INTERNET L. INST., 975, 989-90 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Liter
ary Property Course Handbook Series No. 60-0001, 1998) (contrasting inconsistent
holdings).
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States Supreme Court-which was not shy in discussing personal
jurisdiction in the decade immediately preceding the Internet ex
plosion-has yet to weigh in on the current debate, as does the First
Circui~ Court of Appeals.
This Article examines traditional concepts of personal jurisdic
tion, as applied within the federal courts, in relation to cyberspace.
Central to the discussion are three Supreme Court opinions: (1)
AsahiMetal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,8 the Court's most re
cent, in-depth personal jurisdictional foray, in which a plurality of
the Court found that the "placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purpose
fully directed toward the forum State"; (2) Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz ,9 in which the Court analyzed personal jurisdiction is
sues in the context of contractual breaches; and (3) Calder v.
Jones,lO in which the Court looked at personal jurisdiction through
the lens of intentional conduct. These three cases-Asahi, Burger
King, and Calder-.provlde a simple A-B-C formula for resolving
nearly every personal jurisdiction-Internet dispute within the Dis
trict of Massachusetts. This foundation is based principally on a
defendant's targeting, or purposefully directing, his or her actions at
the forum state.
Part I of this Article sets forth the legal framework in which
the personal jurisdiction-Internet dispute arises. Specifically, Part I
provides a personal jurisdiction primer and discusses the Supreme
Court's A-B-C trilogy. Part II analyzes the personal jurisdiction
Internet paradigm and comments on several related legal concepts.
Part III discusses how personal jurisdiction-Internet disputes have
been resolved thus far in the District of Massachusetts.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

It is helpful to begin by describing several fundamental per
sonal jurisdiction concepts. The discussion will then turn to the Su
preme Court's A-B-C trilogy: Asahi, Burger King, and Calder.
A.

Personal Jurisdiction Primer

Among the basic concepts in the area of personal jurisdiction
are the following: the issue of general, versus the more common
specific, jurisdiction; the requirement that jurisdiction over a non
8. 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
9. 471 U.S. 462, 463 (1985).
10. 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984).
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resident comport with the long-arm statute of the forum state; and
the application of a sophisticated due process inquiry.u Each of
these concepts is highly relevant to the application of personal juris
diction in cyberspace.
1.

General vs. Specific Jurisdiction

A fundamental concept in the personal jurisdiction inquiry is
the distinction between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction.
Briefly, general jurisdiction requires that a defendant has such
"continuous and systematic" contacts with a forum that he is sub
ject to personal jurisdiction in that state for just about any action
that can be brought against him.12 Specific jurisdiction, on the
other hand, may be established only if the specific cause of action
arises out of the forum related activityP
A good example of what has traditionally been required to es
tablish general jurisdiction can be found in the Supreme Court's
1952 decision, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining CO.14 In
Perkins, the Court upheld an Ohio court's assertion of general juris
diction over a Philippine company, finding that the president of the
company had maintained an office in Ohio from which he con
ducted activities on behalf of the corporation, kept company files,
held directors' meetings, and carried on correspondence relating to
the business. 15 The Court also found that the president had distrib
uted salary checks drawn on two active Ohio bank accounts, en
gaged an Ohio bank to act as transfer agent, and while in Ohio,
"supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corpora
tion's properties in the Philippines."16 "In short, the foreign corpo
ration, through its president, 'had been carrying on in Ohio a
continuous and systematic;but limited, part of its general business,'
and the exercise of general jurisdiction over the Philippine corpora
tion by [the] Ohio court was 'reasonable and juSt."'17
At the other extreme in the traditional analysis, the Supreme
11. See Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 89 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing, inter alia,
Helicopteros Nacionales deColombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984».
12. See Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st
Cir. 1999).
13. See id. (applying a three-part test in determining whether the claim arises out
of the forum-related activity).
14. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
15. Id. at 447-48.
16. Id. at 448.
17. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984)
(quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 445).
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Court has found an absence of general jurisdiction in Texas over a
foreign company where the contacts of the company were limited. 18
The company's chief executive officer attended contract negotia
tions in Texas, and the company accepted checks drawn on a Texas
bank, purchased expensive equipment and training services from a
Texas company, and sent personnel to Texas for training. 19 At best,
therefore, the Texas courts could only attempt to assert specific ju
risdiction over the foreign defendant, an issue the Supreme Court
did not reach.20
Although the issue of general (versus specific) jurisdiction is
often analyzed under the due process inquiry, it is relevant now
since the courts have almost universally rejected the argument that
merely entering cyberspace by putting up a web-site permits gen
eral jurisdiction over the site creator. 21 There is, however, at least
one possible exception. In Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp. ,22 the court
held that an interactive web-site that responds to consumer product
inquiries, coupled with the defendant's "traditional business con
tacts" with Texas, establishes general jurisdiction.23 Mieczkowski,
however, has been distinguished 24 and criticized25 by courts and re
jected by at least one commentator. 26
2.

Long-Arm Statutes

As every law student knows by January of the first year, to
establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the
18. See id. at 418 n.12.
19. Id. at 416.
20. See id. at 418 n.12 (noting that there was no assertion of specific jurisdiction).
21. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086
(9th Cir. 2000); Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th
Cir. 1999); Am. Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglasses & Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp.
2d 895, 899 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical
Prods. Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
22. 997 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
23. Id. at 788 (noting that the greater "level of interactivity" makes it more than
just a passive site).
24. See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330-31
(D.S.C. 1999) (distinguishing Mieczkowski and holding that "[g]eneral in personam ju
risdiction must be based on more than a defendant's mere presence on the Internet
even if it is an 'Interactive' presence").
25. See Coastal Video Communications Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d
562, 571 (E.D. Va. 1999) (indicating that distinguishing Mieczkowski and its general
jurisdiction analysis "is not complete").
26. See Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More
Is Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.c. L. REv. 925, 934 (1998)
(noting that Mieczkowski is the "one notable exception" to the no general jurisdiction
rule).
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plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant's conduct sat
isfies two things: (1) the applicable long-arm statute and (2) the due
process requirements of the United States Constitution. 27 A so
phisticated long-arm statute analysis can often make or break a
Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.
Essentially, there are two types of long-arm statutes.28 Statutes
in states such as New Jersey, Arizona, and Missouri have been in
terpreted to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full
extent permitted by the due process c1ause. 29 Other states such as
Connecticut and New York, are more micro-managerial.3° Their
long-arm statutes define specific instances in which personal juris
diction is properly exercised: for example, when the cause of action
arises from the defendant's transacting any business in the state,
when the case derives from the asseition that the defendant caused
tortious injury by acting within the state, or when the matter is tied
to the defendant's having or owning real property in the state. 31 In
Massachusetts, the approximately 2SD-word long-arm statute fol
lows the micro-managerial model:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or
equity arising from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this commonwealth;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this commonwealth;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this com
monwealth;
.
(4) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or
omission outside this commonwealth if he regularly does or solic
its business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
27. Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70.F.3d 1381, 1387 (1st Cir. 1995).
28. See, e.g., Cent. Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v. Burten, 634 F. Supp. 128, 130
(E.D. Pa. 1986); Michael 1. Dunne & Anna L. Musacchio, Jurisdiction over the Internet,
54 Bus. LAW. 385, 387-88 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Imo Indus., Inc. v; Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998)
(indicating that "New lersey['s] long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal juris
diction to the fullest limits of due process"); Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d
1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The Arizona long-arm statute provides for personal juris
diction co-extensive with the limits of federal due process."); Portnoy v. Defiance, Inc.,
951 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that Missouri's "statutory language was in
tended to provide for jurisdiction within the specific categories enumerated in the stat
ute, to the full extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. 52-59b (2001); N.Y. c.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney
2001).
31. See CONN. GEN. STAT. 52-59b (2001); N.Y. C.PLR. 302 (McKinney 2001);
see also Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 28, at 387-88.
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or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in this commonwealth;
(5) having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this
commonwealth;
,
(6) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this commonwealth at the tiine of contracting;
(7) maintaining a domicile in this commonwealth while a party to
a personal or marital relationship out of which arises a claim for
divorce, alimony, property settlement, parentage of a child, child
support or child custody; or the commission of any act giving rise
,to such a claim; or
(8) having been subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction of
a court of the commonwealth which has resulted in an order of
alimony, custody, child support or property settlement, notwith
standing the subsequent departure of one of the original parties
from the commonwealth, if the action involves modification of
such order or orders and the moving party resides in the com
monwealth, or if the action involves enforcement of such order
notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party.32

While many find the complex due process inquiry to raise the
most interesting questions (even this Article focuses almost exclu
sively on due process principles), long-arm statutes should not be
overlooked. For example, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,33
an early Internet case discussed more fully below, the trial court
determined that personal jurisdiction was improper under both the
New York long-arm statute and the due process clause of the Four
teenth Amendment. 34 On appeal, the Second Circuit, while not dis
counting the district court's "scholarly" due process analysis,
affirmed the court's conclusion simply because the exercise of per
sonal jurisdiction was proscribed by the statutory law of New
York. 35
3.

Due Process Inquiry

In a specific jurisdiction case, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the defendant's conduct, in addition to satisfying the
state's long-arm statute, also comports with due process. 36 Case law
in the First Circuit breaks the due process inquiry into three
elements:
32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (1998).
33. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
34. Id. at 299-30l.
35. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997).
36. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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First, an inquiring court must ask whether the claim that under
girds the litigation directly relates to or arises out of the defen
dant's contacts with the forum. Second, the court must ask
whether those contacts constitute purposeful availment of the
benefits and protections afforded by the forum's laws. Third, if
the proponent's case clears the first two hurdles, the court then
must analyze the overall reasonableness of an exercise of juris
diction in light of a variety of pertinent factors that touch upon
the fundamental fairness of an exercise of jurisdiction. 37
An affirmative resolution of each of the three elements is neces
sary to support a finding of specific jurisdiction. 38

Initially, in a contract claim, the court asks "whether the defen
dant's forum-based activities are instrumental in the formation of
the contract" or, in a tort claim, "whether the plaintiff has estab
lished cause in fact ... and legal cause .... "39 At a later stage of
the inquiry, the court must analyze certain "Gestalt" factors: the
burden on the defendant in appearing; the interest of the forum
state in adjudicating the dispute; the interest of the plaintiff in ob
taining convenient and effective relief; the interest of the judicial
system in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy;
and the common interests of all sovereigns in the promotion of sub
stantive social policies. 40
It is a portion of the second stage of analysis-the purposeful
ness of the defendant's conduct-that has much resonance in the
Internet arena. In the First Circuit's vernacular, the court must ask
whether the defendant's web-based contacts (perhaps among other
37. Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st
Cir. 1999). Other circuits often collapse the inquiry into two components. See, e.g.,
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The required due
process inquiry itself has two parts: whether a defendant has minimum contacts with the
forum state and whether ... the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under the circum
stances of a particular case.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Imo In
dus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1999) (similar); see also Brown v.
Slenker, 220 F.3d 411,417 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The Due Process Clause permits the exer
cise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if: 1) that defendant has
minimum contacts with the forum state; and 2) the exercise of jurisdiction does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
38. Phillips Exeter Acad., 196 F.3d at 288; see also id. at 288 n.l ("[T]he relative
strength or weakness of the plaintiffs showing on the first two elements bears upon the
third element (the overall fairness of an exercise of jurisdiction).").
39. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir.
1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
40. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d
1080, 1088 (1st Cir. 1992).
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traditional contacts) "constitute purposeful availment of the bene
fits and protections afforded by the forum's laws. "41 Asked another
way, did the defendant, through his Internet activity, intend to tar
get the foreign state?
B.

The Supreme Court's A-B-Cs

Knowledge of a trilogy of Supreme Court cases from the 1980s
is essential to resolving current personal jurisdiction-Internet dis
putes. These three cases are referred to herein, in reverse chrono
logical order, as the A-B-Cs: Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior
Court,42 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,43 and Calder v. Jones. 44
Each of these cases, to a certain extent, focuses on the purposeful
ness component of the due process inquiry; they ask to what extent
has the defendant targeted the forum state? Before specifically an
alyzing these cases, however, it is necessary to discuss purposeful
availment further.
1.

Purposeful Availment

Modern notions of personal jurisdiction begin with Interna
tional Shoe Co. v. State ofWashington 45 which established the "min
imum contacts" test. 46 In Hanson v. Denckla,47 the Court
supplemented International Shoe by holding that an act "by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws," is also necessary to the due process
inquiry.48 Two decades later, in Kulko v. Superior Court,49 the
41. Philips Exeter Acad., 196 F.3d at 288.
42. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
43. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
44. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
45. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. Id. at 316. Historically, a court's in personam jurisdiction power was
"grounded on [its] de facto power over the defendant's person" and, therefore, the
defendant's "presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him." Id. (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714,733 (1877)). In International Shoe, however, the Court recognized that the capias
ad respondendum had given way to personal service of summonses or other form of
notice. Thus, the Court held that "due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
47. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
48. Id. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,319 (1945)).
49. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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Court reinforced Hanson, applying again a "purposeful availment"
test as a standard for fulfilling minimum contacts. 50
In Kulko, the plaintiff was a California mother who sought to
increase child support payments from the defendant-father who
lived in New York.51 Finding that the "purposeful availment" test
should be limited to wrongful activity causing injury in the forum
state (California), the Court held that the father, who merely "al
low[ ed] [his children] to spend more time in California than was
required under a separation agreement[,] can hardly be said to have
'purposefully availed himself' of the 'benefits and protections' of
California's laws."52 In other words, it was not the defendant, but
the plaintiff, who had targeted California.
A few years after Kulko, the Court continued the process of
the "purposeful availment" analysis. In World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,53 the Court held that a New York automobile
retailer and wholesaler could not be haled into an Oklahoma court
in a products liability case involving one of its cars.54 Justice
White's majority opinion stated that it is "critical" to any due pro
cess analysis
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there .... The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the
"orderly administration of the laws," ... gives a degree of pre
dictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privi
lege of conducting activities within the forum State," ... it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there .... 55

Clearly, the "purposeful availment," or targeting, prong of the
due process inquiry, is "alive and well."56 In this respect, the First
Circuit's separation of purposeful availment from the other prongs
of the inquiry-as compared with other jurisdictions which collapse
50. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcnCE
AND PROCEDURE § 1067 (2d ed. 1987).
51. 436 U.S. at 86-88.
52. Id. at 94.
53. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
54. Id. at 295.
55. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citations
omitted».
56. Welinsky v. Resort of the World D.N.v., 839 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1988).
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the analysis57-makes eminent sense.
2.

Asahi: Stream of Commerce

The "A" case in this targeting triumvirate, Asahi Metal Indus
try Co. v. Superior Court,58 is the Supreme Court's famous "stream
of commerce" decision. 59 Asahi concerned an indemnification dis
pute between a Taiwanese tire company (Cheng Shin) and a Japa
nese tire valve manufacturer (AsahO that was residual to a product
liability action initiated in a California court and later settled in
other respects. 60 The Supreme Court reversed the California state
court judgment holding that California had jurisdiction over Cheng
Shin's claim against Asahi. 61 Asahi's only contact with California
was selling tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan, followed by Cheng
Shin's inserting some of the Asahi valves into tires it sold in Califor
nia. 62 The sales alleged in Asahi were numerous and continuing. 63
Justice O'Connor, delivering the judgmerit of the unanimous
Court, found that California's exercise of jurisdiction over Cheng
Shin's claim against Asahi was beyond the limits of the due process
clause. 64 In one part of the opinion, Justice O'Connor, speaking for
a plurality of four-herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell,
and Justice Scalia-stated that
[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, with
out more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State .... [A] defendant's awareness that the
stream of commerce mayor will sweep the product into the fo
rum State, does not convert the mere act of placing the product
into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the fo
rum State. 65

Accordingly, because Asahi's only "contact" with California
57. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a description of the First Cir
cuit's analysis.
58. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
59. "Stream of commerce" principles were actually first formulated by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761,
766 (Ill. 1961), and further analyzed by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 444 U.S. at 297-98.
60. 480 U.S. at 105-06.
61. Id. at 108.
62. Id. at 106.
63. See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tee Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1992)
(explaining Asahi).
64. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115-16.
65. Id. at 112.
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was its awareness that Cheng Shin sold tires with Asahi valves to
consumers in California, Asahi did not purposefully establish any
contacts in California such that it should have reasonably antici
pated being haled into court in that state. 66
Justice O'Connor gave some examples of the "something
more" that would constitute a purposeful direction of action into a
forum state: designing a product for a particular state's market; ad
vertising; establishing channels for advice to customers in the state;
or using a distributor as a sales agent in the forum.67 However, as
the recent Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project report points out,
"[i]ntuitively, it would seem unlikely that many parts manufacturers
would engage in such conduct."68 Even so, it was clear to Justice
O'Connor that activity must be purposefully directed toward the fo
rum in order to confer jurisdiction on a potential defendant. 69 Sev
eral circuits, including the First Circuit, have squarely addressed the
stream-of-commerce issue since Asahi and adopted Justice
O'Connor's plurality view. 70
3.

Burger King: Contractual Issues

Purposeful direction was also at the center of the "B" case in
the trilogy. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz ,71 the defendant, a
Michigan businessman (Rudzewicz), had allegedly breached his
franchise agreement with the corporation. 72 The corporation,
therefore, sued Rudzewicz in Florida even though he had not been
See id. at 112-13.
Id. at 111-12.
68. Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 45.
69. Asahi, 480 u.s. at 112. Another four Justices, Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, disagreed, stating that placing a product into the stream of commerce is a
purposeful act directed at the forum state as long as the defendant is aware the product
is being marketed in the forum state. Id. at 116-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens, joined by White and Blackmun, rea
soned, in a concurring opinion, that placing a product into the stream of commerce may
rise to the level of a purposeful availment depending on the volume, value, and hazard
ous character of the product. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Boit v. Gar
Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1992); Benitez-Allende v. Alcan
Aluminio Do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1988) (both explaining the Asahi
opinion).
70. See Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1990); Falkirk Mining
Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 375-76 (8th Cir. 1990); cf Keds Corp. v.
Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 220 (1st Cir. 1989); Hugel v. McNeil, 886 F.2d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989).
71. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
72. Id. at 468-69. Burger King, the national hamburger chain, is headquartered in
Miami. Id. at 464.
66.
67.
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present in Florida in any jurisdictionally significant wayJ3 The
Court, siding with the corporation, agreed that Rudzewicz had pur
posefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in
Florida. 74 According to the Court, "[s]o long as a commercial ac
tor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another
State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of
physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there."75
The Court's determination in Burger King was based on a vari
ety of factors: Rudzewicz was a sophisticated businessman; the con
tract was long-term, of high value, and closely supervised;
Rudzewicz had himself solicited the franchise and actively negoti
ated the contract's terms; the contract had a choice of Florida law
provision; and Rudzewicz's payments under the contract-the
center of the dispute-were to be sent to MiarniJ6 As in Asahi, the
theme underlying these factors was that Rudzewicz had targeted
Florida; therefore, purposefully availing himself of that state's
lawsJ7
4.

Calder: Intentional Effects

The third case in the trilogy, the "c" case, is Calder v. Jones.78
Like Burger King and Asahi, Calder too focuses on "intentional"
conduct, the purposefulness component of the due process in
quiry.79 Calder was a libel action brought by the California actress,
Shirley Jones, against the editor and an author of the National En
quirer, neither of whom had been in California in any meaningful
way.80 Critical to the Court's finding that personal jurisdiction over
these two individuals was indeed warranted were two things: (1) the
story focused on California, the center of Jones' life and Hollywood
career; and (2) all aspects of the defendants' alleged conduct (writ
ing, editing and, ultimately, libeling) were intentional acts targeting
a California resident. 81 Thus, the Court held that it was reasonable
for the defendants to "anticipate being haled into court there to
73. See Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 53 (discussing
Burger King).
74. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482.
75. Id. at 476.
76. Id. at 478-82, 485.
77. See id. at 482.
78. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
79. See id. at 789.
80. Id. at 784-86; see also Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at
49 (discussing Calder).
81. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
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answer for the truth of [their] statements."82
II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION ENTERS THE CYBER-AGE

This section of the Article will analyze some early attempts to
resolve thorny personal jurisdiction-Internet issues and comment
on several related legal concepts. Throughout, analogy will be
made to the targeting framework.
A.

Early Personal Jurisdiction-Internet Decisions

Because the Internet has shattered many traditional concepts
of space, the legal system has been forced, for better or worse, to
formulate new working jurisdictional rules. Absent legislative ac
tion, responsibility for this formulation has fallen largely on the
courtS.83 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King84 and Zippo Manufac
turing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 85 represent two initial judicial
attempts at this task. In both cases, the courts looked principally at
the complexity of the defendant's web-sites. While subsequent
cases have followed Zippo and Bensusan's analyses, the courts are
increasingly looking to the targeting of the forum state in accor
dance with the A-B-C trilogy previously discussed. 86
1.

Bensusan

In Bensusan,87 the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's de

termination that the operator of a "small" Missouri jazz club named
"The Blue Note" could not be sued for trademark infringement in
New York by the famous Manhattan club of the same' name solely
because the defendant had established an Internet web-site linking
the two entities. 88 According to the trial court, "[c]reating a site,
like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
[d. at 790.
83. However, the recent Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report recommends a
set of basic default rules, described below, that might serve as a legislative foundation of
a fair system of jurisdictional jurisprudence for cyberspace commerce. Global Cyber
space Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 18-26; see Legal Experts Call for Global Com
mission to Resolve E-Commerce Jurisdiction Issues, 69 U.S.L. WK. 2048 (July 18, 2000)
(describing the Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report). Also, Congress has enacted a
statute dealing with certain in rem "cybersquatting" issues. See discussion infra Part
Il.B.2.
84. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
85. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
86. See supra Part LB.
87. 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
88. [d. at 29.
82.
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nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act
purposefully directed toward the forum state."89 The Missouri club
owner did not target New York, the court found, since information
on the web-site described a distinctly Missouri connection. 90

2.

Zippo: Look to the Web-Site

In Zippo, the plaintiff was a Pennsylvania manufacturer of the
well known "Zippo" tobacco lighters. 91 It sued the defendant-a
California Internet news service provider operating under the name
of "Zippo Dot Com, Inc."-in Pennsylvania for various violations
of the Federal Trademark Act.92 According to the facts of the case,
the defendant had, worldwide, about 140,000 paying subscribers to
its news service, two percent of whom were from Pennsylvania.93
The defendant had also entered into agreements with seven Penn
sylvania Internet providers to permit their subscribers access to the
defendant's news service. 94
The key to the court's resolution of the personal jurisdiction
inquiry was the quantum of interactivity the defendant's web-site
offered. The court was almost mathematical in its analysis. Ac
cording to Judge Sean McLaughlin, "the likelihood that personal
jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportion
ate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity
conducts over the Internet."95 The three-part "sliding scale" of in
teraction established by Zippo was expressed as follows:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant
. clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over
the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end
are situations where a defendant has simply posted information
on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign
jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make
information available to those who are interested in it is not
grounds for the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction. The middle
ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can ex
change information with the host computer. In these cases, the
89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.

95.

Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
See id.
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
Id.
!d.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
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exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of informa
tion that occurs on the Web site. 96

Based on this standard, the court found that the defendant in Zippo
was "doing business over the Internet" and, thus, the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant in Pennsylvania was proper. 97
3.

A Return to Targeting

To a large extent, Bensusan and Zippo reflect the A-B-C cases'
focus on the purposefulness of the defendants' conduct. An indi
vidual who intentionally targets a forum by entering into contracts
with forum residents, such as Zippo, or electronically links itself to
the plaintiff, as did Bensusan, is doing more to establish a tie to the
forum than one who simply puts up a passive web-site. In this re
spect, Zippo appropriately rejected Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction
Set,98 a case where the court exercised personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant whose contacts with the forum consisted
only of posting a passive web-site-albeit one accessible to an esti
mated 10,000 forum residents-and maintaining a toll-free tele
phone number. 99
Still, Zippo and Bensusan are not without their critics. One
team of commentators postulates, "[i]f, in order to avoid the risk of
being haled into [every] court across the country, you must limit
your company's use of the Web to simply a passive, static Website,
then why bother?"IOO Others, too, have rejected a per se adherence
to these cases' mathematical analyses. IOI
96. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
97. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
98. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
99. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125. Other courts, too, have specifically rejected
the Inset analysis. See, e.g., JB Oxford Holdings, Inc. v. Net Trade, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d
1363, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); Fix My PC, L.L.C. v. N.F.N. Assocs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 640,
644 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686-87 (E.D.
Va. 1999). As stated by a district judge in Oregon: "lacking in Inset . .. [is] the principle
that a defendant must 'purposefully direct' its activities at or take 'deliberate action' in
or create 'substantial connection' with the forum state so as to provide fair warning that
such activities may subject defendant to jurisdiction in a distant forum." Millennium
Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (D. Or. 1999).
100. Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal Juris
diction and the Internet, 24 No.2 LITIG. 27, 34 (1998).
101. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 471 (D.
Mass. 1997) (finding it "troubl[ing] ... to force corporations that do business over the
Internet, precisely because it is cost-effective, to now factor in the potential costs of
defending against litigation in each and every state"); Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction

2002]

JURISDICTION-INTERNET ISSUES IN MASSACHUSETTS

253

There is, thankfully, a movement afoot to look deeper than the
mere level of interactivity or passivity of a particular web-site. For
example, in Millennium Enterprises, the court refused to conclude
that the potential of doing business within a state via an interactive
web-site constituted the actual doing of such business.102 In cases
such as Millennium Enterprises, the focus is shifting more squarely
to the targeting of forum residents actually undertaken, i.e., the de
fendant's intent. Such a methodology gets back to Asahi, Burger
King, and Calder's doctrinal roots.103
Some cases in this movement have explicitly latched onto
Asahi's stream of commerce language, particularly Justice
O'Connor's admonition that "something more" than the mere
placement of a product into the stream is required. 104 Thus, in
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. ,105 the court noted that the Florida
defendant, although posting an essentially passive web-site alleg
edly infringing on the Arizona plaintiff's trademark, had done es
sentially no more than that:
[It] did nothing to encourage people in Arizona to access its
site, ... there [was] no evidence that any part of its business ...
was sought or achieved in Arizona .... [I]t entered into no con
tracts in Arizona, made no sales in Arizona, received no tele
phone calls from Arizona, earned no income from Arizona, and
sent no messages over the Internet to Arizona. 106
Report, supra note 1, at 60 ("If each web site subjected its sponsor to global jurisdiction,
many would forego use of the technology for fear of its secondary costs."); cf. id. at 63
(noting that, because of Zippo, courts have become "clearly ... convinced that the
nature of a defendant's web site is relevant to the jurisdictional issue, but a failure to
articulate why it is relevant makes it difficult to determine where the jurisdictional line
should be drawn in cases that fall between Zippo's two extremes").
102. See Millenium Enters., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 922.
103. See Rothschild Berry Farm v. Serendipity Group L.L.c., 84 F. Supp. 2d 904,
910 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that an interactive site not used by forum residents was
insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction); Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report,
supra note 1, at 65 ("Reliance ... on the nature of the web site alone is misplaced. If an
interactive site is not targeted to a specific forum, courts should focus on how the site is
actually used.") (footnote omitted).
104. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th CiT.
1998) (using the "something more" analysis); S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ul
trasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537,540 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (using the "something more"
analysis); Rothschild Berry Farm, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 910; Fix My PC, L.L.c. v. N.F.N.
Assocs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 640, 642-43 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (using the "something more"
analysis).
105. 130 F.3d 414 (9th CiT. 1997).
106. !d. at 419; see also Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Asahi plurality).
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Other courts that have also attempted to limn the "something
more" that might be required under Asahi, however, have met with
varying resuits.l07 One commentator has argued that the
"hodgepodge" of district court decisions on this point "is inconsis
tent, irrational, and irreconcilable."lo8 While the author does not
hold such a bleak view, the point is well taken; more uniform direc
tion from either the courts of appeal or Congress is needed. In
deed, as the Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project report points
out:
The difficulty with the application of the stream of commerce
doctrine in Cyberspace is that the theory is designed to deal with
jurisdictional issues in a very particularized context, claims of in
jury caused by the negligence of a parts manufacturer.... The
theory ... is not relevant when ... the claim is that the defendant
infringed the plaintiff's trademark, a claim analogous to the com
mission of an intentional tort from which the defendant derives
no economic benefit. lo9

In short, reliance on Asahi alone, while useful, is not the complete
answer.
To be sure, Burger King's focus on intentional affiliation helps,
and one court of appeals has, at least implicitly, followed Burger
King's path. l1O In CompuServe, an Ohio computer information ser
vice (CompuServe) sued a Texas marketer of software (Patterson)
in Ohio.1 11 The suit sought a declaratory judgment as to the appli
cability of a "Shareware Registration Agreement" the parties had
mutually entered into.H z The agreement, which called for the ap
plication of Ohio law, allowed Patterson to place his software on
107. Compare Fix My PC, L.L.c., 48 F. SUpp. 2d at 644 (finding web-site plus
toll-free number and anecdotal evidence that plaintiff's customers mistakenly called de
fendant not enough to establish personal jurisdiction), with Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes
Found., 958 F. SUpp. 1,4-5 (D.D.C. 1996) (reasoning that web-site plus toll-free number
and solicitations sufficient to establish purposeful availment), and Cybersell, Inc., 130
F.3d at 418-19 (describing "something more" as having toll-free number, entering into
contracts in the forum, and selling goods in the forum).
108. Stravitz, supra note 26, at 939 & n.108 (citing, as examples, four district court
decisions: Am. Network, Inc. v. Access Am.lConnect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494,
498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. SUpp. 481, 486 (W.D.N.C.
1997); Heroes, Inc., 958 F. Supp. at 4-5; Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996».
109. Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 47-48.
110. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-64 (6th Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 1260-61.
112. Id.
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CompuServe's system for others to buy.113 Although less than $650
of Patterson's software was actually purchased by Ohio residents,
the court held that the Buckeye State could assert jurisdiction over
him because, like the defendant in Burger King, Patterson "know
ingly made an effort" and, in fact, purposefully contracted "to mar
ket a product in other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe
operating, in effect, as his distribution center."114 Targeting, once
again, ruled the day.
In fact, a host of personal jurisdiction-Internet cases have suc
cessfully applied the Burger King-CompuServe paradigm. 11s The
theme of these cases is that intentionally-based, contractual affilia
tion is a workable methodology for resolving many, if not all, per
sonal jurisdiction-Internet disputes.
Finally, targeting remains clearly at the center of those per
sonal jurisdiction-Internet cases following Calder.116 The most fa
mous of these is Panavision.1 17 In Panavision, the California
owners of the PANAVISION (R) and PANAFLEX (R) marks sued
an Illinois man who had registered the domain names panavi
sion.com and panaflex.com in California. us Relying on Calder, the
Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had manifested an intention
to do business in California-and was thus subject to personal juris
diction there-by attempting to extort money from the California
plaintiffs. 119 Like the defendants in Calder, this Illinois cybersquat
ter knew that the brunt of harm to the plaintiff would be felt in
California, "the heart of the theatrical motion picture and television
industry."12o Accordingly, as in Calder, the court found that the
exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant in California-the targeted
jurisdiction-was proper. 121
113.

Id.

114. Id. at 1263.
115. See, e.g., Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v. VocalTec Communications, Inc., 122 F.
Supp. 2d 1046, 1050-51 (D. Minn. 2000); Bailey v. Turbine DeSign, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d
790, 793-95 (W.D. Tenn. 2000); Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int'I Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d
1105,1111-12 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356,
1364-65 (W.D. Ark. 1997).
116. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088
(9th Cir. 2000); Bailey, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 796-97; McMaster-Carr Supply Co. v. Supply
Depot, Inc., No. 98C1903, 1999 WL 417352, at *4 (N.D. III. June 16, 1999).
117. Pan avis ion Int'l, L.P., v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1321-22.
120. Id. at 1321.
121. Id. at 1324. Since Panavision, the Ninth Circuit has intertwined the "some
thing more" of Asahi with the "intentional conduct" of Calder to describe "[e]xpress
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Related Legal Concepts

Before proceeding to analyze the District of Massachusetts
cases, several loose ends should be addressed. This subsection com
ments briefly on three additional issues: (1) the role of the Eastern
District of Virginia in the analysis; (2) the Anticybersquatting Con
sumer Protection Act of 1999 ("ACPA"); and (3) the Global Cyber
space Jurisdiction Project report's proposed default rules.
1.

A Note on the Eastern District of Virginia

There is a tempting "solution" to tricky personal jurisdiction
Internet issues-that is, channeling many federal Internet-based
cases through the Eastern District of Virginia. The rationale for
this theory goes something like this: Network Solutions, Inc.
("NSI") registers most United States-based domain names; NSI is
located in eastern Virginia; because many web-site disputes involve
domain names, they touch (however incidentally) on NSI and, in
turn, the Eastern District of Virginia; ergo, there is personal juris
diction in the Eastern District of Virginia over any such dispute.
Indeed, in rem proceedings regarding domain names are already
being funneled into the Eastern District of Virginia. 122
While superficially appealing, establishing a special Internet
district in non-in rem cases is a bad idea. First, personal jurisdiction
in most such cases would be based solely on a standard contract
with NSI. It is settled, however, at least in the Fourth Circuit,
where the Eastern District of Virginia sits, that a mere contract be
tween a forum resident and a non-resident defendant does not pro
vide sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. 123 In
this respect, rejecting the Eastern District of Virginia as a jurisdic
tional clearinghouse in these type of cases is similar to the near uni
versal rejection of the District of Columbia District as the forum for
aiming[:] ... a concept that in the jurisdictional context hardly defines itself ... [yet] is
satisfied when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at
a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state." Bancroft &
Masters, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1087.
122. See, e.g., Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace. com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 505
(E.D. Va. 2000); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodrome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860
(E.D. Va. 2000); Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D.
Va. 2000).
123. See Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 478 (4th
Cir. 1993); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 856 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(citing Ellicott Mach. and concluding that domain name registration agreements with
NSI from which plaintiffs' claim arises are insufficient contacts with Virginia for pur
poses of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant).
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all cases where contact with a federal agency is involved. 124
Second, domain names are "relatively minor portion[s] of the
Internet's architecture, and a minuscule presence in [Virginia ]."125
In the A-B-C lexicon, there is little evidence that the average defen
dant (in say Florida) who is sued by the average plaintiff (in say
Massachusetts) over domain name usage purposefully availed her
self of, or intended to target, Virginia. 126 If anything, the Florida
defendant in this hypothetical is targeting Massachusetts.
Finally, to paraphrase a recent "government contacts" case,
"[t]o permit courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
whose sole contact with the [Eastern District of Virginia] consists of
dealing with [NSI] not only would pose a threat to ... public partic
ipation in [cyberspace], but also would threaten to convert the
[Eastern District of Virginia] into a national judicial forum."127
This practical argument-no matter how much busy docket clerks
in other parts of the country might disagree-is perhaps the strong
est reason to avoid the temptation to ship most Internet cases to the
Eastern District of Virginia.
2.

The ACPA

The ACPA, which was signed by President Clinton on Novem
ber 29, 1999,128 targets bad faith registration or use of domain
names. 129 In addition to providing statutory damages (in the tens of
thousands of dollars) for cybersquatting violations, the ACPA cre
ates a federal in rem action against domain names,13o However, the
in rem provisions kick in only after the trademark owner has made
unsuccessful efforts to identify a forum somewhere in the United
States that has personal jurisdiction over the registrant. 131 The
ACPA has already been upheld by some lower courts,132 and, as
124. See, e.g., Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 831 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Lamb v. Turbine Design, Inc., 538 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 2000); Envtl. Research Int'!,
Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. 1976).
125. Am. Online, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (citing Network Solutions, Inc. v. Unbro
Int'!, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 85 (Va. 2000».
126. See id.
127. Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 831 (quoting Envtl. Research, 355 A.2d at 813); accord
Lamb, 538 S.E.2d at 439.
128. 15 U.S.c. 1125(d) (2000).
129. See § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) & (ii).
130. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
131. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii). See generally Mark A. Thurmon, Federal Courts and the
Internet, 2000 WL 23831154 (June 29,2000) (describing ACPA).
132. See, e.g., Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 505
(E.D. Va. 2000).
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indicated, is funneling (for better or for worse) in rem domain dis
putes to the Eastern District of Virginia. 133
3.

The Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project report's
Proposed Default Rules

In the summer of 2000, the Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction
Project in its report to the American Bar Association proposed a
number of "jurisdictional default rules." With regard to personal
jurisdiction, the report proposes, among other things, the following:
1.1.1. Every Internet party should be subject to personal ... ju
risdiction somewhere. In reasonable circumstances, more than
one state may be able to assert ... personal ... jurisdiction in
electronic commerce transactions, as they have historically in
physical transactions.
1.1.2. Personal . . . jurisdiction should not be asserted based
solely on the accessibility in the state of a passive web site that
does not target the state.
1.1.3.... [P]ersonal ... jurisdiction should be assertable over a
web site content provider ("sponsor") in a state, assuming there
is no enforceable contractual choice of law and forum, if:
1.1.3(a). the sponsor is a habitual resident of that state or has its
principal place of business in that state;
1.1.3(b). the sponsor targets that state and the claim arises out of
the content of the site; or
1.1.3(c). a dispute arises out of a transaction generated through a
web site or service that does not target any specific state, but is
interactive and can be fairly considered knowingly to engage in
business transactions there .1 34

As can be seen from the emphasized portions, the report relies
heavily on targeting and intentional conduct as guiding principles.
In this respect, the report also states that while a global definition
of "targeting" needs to be achieved, "[g]enerically, targeting
should cover technological practices that sponsors use to purpose
fully avail themselves of the commercial benefits of the targeted
states. "135
133. See supra Part n.B.1 for a discussion of the role of the Eastern District of
Virginia in personal jurisdiction-Internet issues.
134. Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Report, supra note 1, at 20-21 (emphasis
added).
135. Id. at 21 n.51.
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Summary

To summarize, the Eastern District of Virginia should not be
utilized as a catch-all forum for Internet cases, even though the
ACPA appears to be herding many in rem cases in that direction.
In addition, Zippo's mathematical adherence to a web-site's activity
appears to be giving way to a new trend in personal jurisdiction
Internet cases-a focus on targeting-and the foundation for that
trend is the A-B-C cases. Indeed, the Global Cyberspace Jurisdic
tion Project is also looking to targeting as a primary guiding princi
ple. The next and final section of this Article explores how these
trends are appearing within the District of Massachusetts.
III.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET WITHIN
THIS DISTRICT

One of the few, non-pending personal jurisdiction-Internet de
cisions from the District of Massachusetts, Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue
Computing, Inc.,136 adopted Zippo's sliding scale and, as a result,
emphasized the level of interaction employed by a particular web
site, over targeting, in determining a personal jurisdiction issueP7
Luckily, Hasbro and others have also relied, to varying degrees, on
Asahi, Burger King, or CaiderP8 It is the view of the author that a
more specific zeroing-in on the "targeting" paradigm might be an
appropriate next step. In other words, the A-B-Cs of targeting
should provide a workable formula for resolving most personal ju
risdiction Internet issues within the District of Massachusetts.
A.

Existing Massachusetts Decisions

As of this writing, only a handful of non-pending personal ju
risdiction Internet decisions exist from the District of Massachu
setts.139 For the most part, these cases are relatively
straightforward. However, they have not yet been comprehensively
136. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997).
137. Id. at 39-40, 45.
138. See, e.g., New Eng. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v.
Rockingham Ventures, Inc., No. 97-12701, 1999 WL 350653, *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 11,1999);
Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 42; Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D.
Mass. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 469-70 (D.
Mass. 1997); see also discussion, infra, regarding New Eng. Horsemen's and Gary Scott.
139. See supra note 138 for a list of those cases. Interested readers should also
review a recent personal jurisdiction-Internet decision. Northern Light Tech., Inc. v.
Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2000), affd, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir.
2001).
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analyzed within the A-B-C paradigm. 140
In Digital, an early, straightforward case in this district, the
court held that it had jurisdiction over the California licensee of the
" AltaVista" trademark in a breach of contract and tort case
brought by the trademark owner, the Massachusetts-based Digital
Equipment Corporation. 141 Although Digital is important for its
comprehensive exegesis of the law in this burgeoning area, it had a
relatively simple framework based primarily on a contract, which
the parties had voluntarily entered into and which specified that
Massachusetts law would apply to their transactions. 142 Moreover,
there was evidence that the defendant had made at least three sales
of software products to Massachusetts residents "in the course of
and related to its operation of a Web-site."143 Finally, with regard
to the plaintiff's tort claim of trademark infringement, the court
found (via a reference to Calder) that the defendant had targeted
Massachusetts since it knew that the object of its harm, the Digital
computer company, was located in Massachusetts. 144
Several other Massachusetts federal cases also employ basic
analyses. In one, a Massachusetts association representing individ
uals involved in New England's horse racing industry filed a breach
of contract action in the district court against a New Hampshire
racetrack. 145 In finding that personal jurisdiction existed, the court
noted that the track maintained an Internet web-site that included
directions to the track from Boston.146 There were, however, nu
merous other Massachusetts contacts. 147 For example, most of the
horses that run at the track were stabled in Massachusetts and
owned by members of the plaintiff's association, a majority of the
track's vendors were Massachusetts residents, the track had adver
tised in both the Boston Globe and the Boston area yellow pages,
and, in fact, the contract at issue involved the track's sending simul
cast signals to Massachusetts tracks.148 Accordingly, even though
140. For a cogent summary of several personal jurisdiction-Internet cases within
this district, see Lawrence H. Reece, III, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 28 MASS.
L. WKLY. 282 (Oct. 11,1999).
141. 960 F. Supp. at 472.
142. See id. at 463-64, 466.
143. Id. at 464.
144. Id. at 470.
145. New Eng. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Rockingham Ven
tures, Inc., No. 97-12701, 1999 WL 350653, *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1999).
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id.
148. [d. at *1-2.
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Asahi's plurality was not mentioned in the opinion, it could clearly
be viewed as an Internet plus "something more" case. Indeed, the
court was so persuaded by the extensive contacts of record that it
took the bold step of concluding that Massachusetts had general
jurisdiction over the track.149
Similarly, in a trademark infringement action, the court found
that Internet advertising, in addition to a plethora of other forms of
direct contact to the state, provided ample basis for the court to
assert personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.1 5o Ex
amples of other types of direct state contact included the defen
dant's making a dozen sales of his allegedly infringing product
(humidors) in Massachusetts, as well as his planning to sell a large
number of humidors to a pharmacy chain that had stores in Massa
chusetts.1 51 As in New England Horsemen's, the court's conclusion
could be justified by the Asahi "something-more" plurality. The
court, however, cited Burger King and stated that in choosing "to
market and sell his humidors nationwide[,] ... [the] defendant ac
cepted both the benefits and the risks of nationwide business."152
A simple reference to Calder might have also sufficed.
These straightforward cases notwithstanding, the final District
of Massachusetts case discussed in this section, Hasbro,153 while
factually complex, also demonstrates the value of the A-B-C para
digm. The plaintiff in Hasbro was the well-known toy company
that has its largest facility in Massachusetts. 154 It manufactures the
"Clue" board game and other Clue-game products.1 55 The defen
dant, Clue Computing, was a small Colorado computer consulting
company that had registered the "clue.com" domain name.1 56 It
had chosen the name "Clue" as a joking reference to the intelli
gence of its founders; i.e., unlike others who are "clueless," they
had a clue. 157 According to the court, Clue Computing had served
less than a dozen clients during its existence and had never gar
149. Id. This is not to suggest that New Eng. Horsemen's is factually on par with
Mieczkowski, the Eastern District of Texas case which, as indicated, has been criticized
for its general jurisdiction-Internet hypothesis. See supra notes 21-23. Rather, New
Eng. Horsemen's is a penultimate example of a defendant's carrying on in Massachu
setts "a continuous and systematic presence."
150. Gary Scott Int') v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 716-17 (D. Mass. 1997).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 717.
153. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997).
154. Id. at 38.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 37-38.
157. Id. at 37 n.1.
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nered more than $80,000 to $100,000 in annual revenues. 158 Unfor
tunately for the company, however, it had a fairly interactive web-.
site which allowed visitors to submit email instantly, as well as ad
vertised the company as a global business that could provide ser
vices "anywhere on the planet."159 The web-site also boasted that
the company had provided services (albeit through another entity)
to Digital Equipment Corp., the Massachusetts-based computer
company.160 Accordingly, the court held that personal jurisdiction
over the defendant was appropriate.1 61
Hasbro, perhaps, approaches the outer borders of what will
justify personal jurisdiction in Internet cases within this district. It
also demonstrates an inherent problem with trying to operate a
small, cyber-business with a goal of marketing around the globe.162
In doing so, one runs the risk of being subjected to personal juris
diction in many different fora. This was so in Hasbro even though,
as the First Circuit recently recognized, there is "very little similar
ity between Hasbro's products and services and those of Clue
Computing."163
Still, the case makes complete sense, when one views it in light
of the A-B-C paradigm. First, in accordance with the Asahi plural
ity, "something more" than the placement of the defendant's ser
vices into the stream of commerce was involved; the defendant had
created an association with a company doing business in Massachu
setts and employed an interactive web-site. 164 Second, that alliance
was an intentional, contract-based relationship which linked it to
another business within Massachusetts, arguably similar to the rela
tionship at issue in Burger King .165 Third, and perhaps most impor
tantly, through the association, the defendant-like the National
Enquirer editor and author in Calder-had targeted Digital, which
the defendant knew was a Massachusetts entity and under whose
accounts the defendant's employee had traveled.1 66 In fact, the
158. Id. at 37.
159. [d. at 38.
160. [d. at 37-38.
161. [d. at 46.
162. As the court acknowledged, no one from Clue Computing had ever traveled
to Massachusetts, it had only one full-time employee, and it had made only eight calls to
the state. [d. at 37-38.
163. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1,2 (1st CiT. 2000). Thus, the
First Circuit ultimately upheld judgment in favor of Clue Computing on Hasbro's in
fringement and dilution claims. [d. at 3.
164. Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 45.
165. See id. at 37-38, 44.
166. See id. at 37-38.
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court pointed out that the defendant's work for Digital comprised,
in effect, one-third to one-half of the defendant's 1995 income. 167
Even though Hasbro relies heavily on Zippo, the first personal ju
risdiction-Internet case it cites,168 in the final analysis it represents a
successful utilization of the A-B-C approach.
B.

Where to Go Next?

The above decisions from the District of Massachusetts indi
cate that these complex jurisdictional issues should, as always, be
resolved in a case-by-case manner. Because the facts of each case
differ, the courts are prudently wary of adopting an all-or-nothing
approach. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts decisions appear to be
concentrating on the A-B-Cs of targeting. Such continued empha
sis would be a proper evolution of personal jurisdiction-Internet is
sues within the District of Massachusetts.
CONCLUSION

As with just about everything in cyberspace, legal issues involv
ing personal jurisdiction and the Internet are exploding at
breakneck speed. What happens next year (or next week) can
make today's news obsolete. For example, at the end of 1996, only
40 million English speakers and 10 million non-English speakers
were on-line.1 69 By the end of 2000, those figures had grown to
approximately 192 million and 211 million, respectivelypO and, by
2005, estimates show that about 320 million English speakers and
820 million non-English speakers will be using the Internet.1 71
Despite this rapid evolution, the Supreme Court's fundamental
focus on targeting provides a staid template for resolving personal
jurisdiction-Internet issues within the District of Massachusetts. To
be sure, one should keep a wary eye on the expansion of legislation,
such as the ACPA or other "default rules," which might alter the
landscape significantly. However, adherence to the A-B-Cs of
167. Id. at 45.
168. See id. at 39-40 (summarizing Zippo's web-site interactivity analysis). But
see Millennium Enters. v. Millenium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (D. Or. 1999)
(declining to adopt Hasbro's reasoning).
169. Global Reach, Evolution & Projections of Online Linguistic Populations at
http://glreach.comlglobstats/evol.html (last revised Mar. 18, 2001).
170. Global, http://glreach.com/globstats/evol.html.
171. Global, http://glreach.comlglobstats/evol.html. Figures such as these-which
indicate that non-English Internet growth is far out-pacing English Internet growth
point to the need for world-wide proposals such as those outlined in the Global Cyber
space Jurisdiction Report.
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targeting should allow one practicing in the Commonwealth's fed
eral courts to resolve most personal jurisdiction-Internet problems
that may arise. In any event, the technological and legal evolution
should be fun to watch.

